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Abstract
Many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when
the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants
from the original auction. The existence of such transactions may ini-
tially appear counter intuitive. However, this paper will show that active
inter-bidder resale results from payo¤maximizing decisions in the auction
that take into account the incentives of a resale opportunity. Specically,
I examine how the existence of an inter-bidder resale opportunity impacts
bidder behavior in an English clock auction, and to what extent altering
the bargaining power of the nal buyer and reseller in the resale market
determines the strategies followed in the initial auction, in an attempt to
understand the existence of these inter-bidder transactions. Theoretical
and behavioral analysis is used to develop hypotheses of speculation (bid-
ding above value) and demand reduction (bidding below value) which are
directly tested in a controlled experimental setting. While value bidding
is a dominant strategy in a standard English clock auction without resale,
when resale is allowed, this theoretical claim is weaker. Demand reduc-
tion is observed when the bargaining power is shifted to the nal buyer
in resale and when the bargaining power is shifted toward the reseller,
speculation is observed. The revenue achieved in the initial auction de-
pends on the behavior observed in the auction. Regardless of bargaining
power, revenue is shown to decrease below what would have been earned
in an English auction without resale due to demand reduction. When the
reseller has the bargaining power, and speculation is observed, this loss in
revenue is somewhat mitigated by increased speculation.
JEL Codes: D44 C90
Key Words: Auctions, Resale, Demand Reduction, Speculation, Exper-
imental Economics
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1 Introduction
Many di¤erent types of auctions, such as real estate auctions, auto auctions,
art auctions, and auctions for raw materials, will have bidders who wish to re-
sell as the primary motivation for participating in the auction. In most cases
these bidders will be intending to resell the item to a buyer who did not partic-
ipate in the auction. There are, however, cases in which resale occurs between
the winner of the auction and one of the participants. The existence of these
inter-bidder transactions may be something of a paradox. Why would a bid-
der participating in the auction ever choose to buy an item in an aftermarket,
instead of attempting to win it in the initial auction?
Examples of this phenomenon can be found in cap and tradeprograms for
emissions allowances, where the allowances are allocated initially by auction and
there are active resale markets.1 In 2004, Virginia auctioned o¤ a percentage of
their nitrogen oxide (NOx) allowances using an English clock auction. Bidders
in this initial auction participated knowing that there was also an active post-
auction trading market in which resale could take place.2 In these cases, future
sales may occur after a participant in the initial auction learns more information
regarding his or his competitorsvalues. However, in Burtraw et al.(2008) re-
sale markets are explicitly modeled in experiments designed to capture market
conditions for the electricity emitting sector and resale occurs even without this
information revelation.
In addition to emissions allowances, the recycling industry constitutes an-
other example of this phenomenon. This industry is comprised of waste-generating
rms, waste-processing rms, and traders who buy waste to sell to the process-
ing rms. The waste-generating rms often choose to sell their scrap material
through an auction where the bidders are traders and processing rms.3 Many
times, these auctions only comprise the initial transaction. They are often fol-
lowed by an active resale trading market of the waste won in the auction, some
of which is inter-bidder resale given the presence of traders.4
Bidders who win and resell may be referred to in practice as brokers, traders,
or speculators but for the purpose of this paper, bidders who participate in an
auction with intentions to resell the item won in the near future will be referred
to as speculators. In a general sense, speculators can be thought of as individuals
who take on risk, whether large or small, for potential gain. In an auction, a
speculator is a bidder who is willing to bid an amount higher than his own use
1Emission allowances are not always auctioned o¤, prior attempts in Europe under the
Emissions Trading Scheme were allocated freely. However, there is a movement to switch
towards an auction mechanism to distribute permits.
2For more details on these auctions, see Porter et al.(2009)
3The primary industry for waste-generating rms is generally not recycling. For example,
carpet producers sell scrap ber for recycling and bottling manufacturers produce scrap plastic.
It could be conjectured that they often hold auctions because of their lack of familiarity with
the recycling industry and how to price their materials.
4This information is provided via a conversation with the owner of a waste trading rm.
Unfortunately, gathering publically available data to substantiate this statement is di¢ cult
given the nature of trading.
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value for the item with intentions of nding a buyer for the item who would be
willing to pay more than his purchase price. Two types of speculation may arise
in an auction format. The rst is the speculator believes buyers with higher
values are not participating in the auction, so he is willing to take on the risk
of bidding above his use value to win the item and resell to bidders who either
did not know about the auction, or chose not to participate in the auction.
The second type of speculation that could occur and explain the inter-bidder
resale trading between auction participants, at least in rst price auctions, is
based on the premise that the speculator knows that bidders may be inclined
to shade their bids from their true value. If this speculator can bid enough to
win, but not enough to surpass the value of the highest bidder, then he could
potentially prot by reselling the item after the auction to the losing bidder(s).
This latter story though poses a puzzle in that it is unclear why this behavior
might persist without bidders responding by increasing their bids to foreclose
the speculators. One possibility is that if speculators are participating in an
auction, then bidders with high values may gain more by intentionally shading
their bid and waiting for the resale market. This relates to the notion of demand
reduction in which individuals abstain from the auction and wait for the resale
market, which depending on the structure of the resale market could lead to a
lower price.
The traditional denition of demand reduction, in a multi-unit auction for-
mat, is bidders reducing demand by not bidding on additional items in order
to reduce the price paid on other units purchased. Abstention from the auction
in a single-unit auction can also be thought of as demand reducing behavior,
because the opportunity exists to purchase the item in resale at a potentially
reduced price. A bidder could also be thought of as demand reducing if they
drop out of an auction below their value as this can still have the desired e¤ect
of decreasing the price in the resale market.
This paper will examine why the existence of an inter-bidder resale oppor-
tunity is not a paradox. It will show that inter-bidder resale results from payo¤
maximizing decisions within the auction that take into account the bargaining
power in the resale market. Key to this analysis is the structure of bargaining
power within resale, which leads to a di¤ering mix of behaviors involving demand
reduction and speculation in the auction. The baseline of analysis begins with
bargaining power equally split between the nal buyer and reseller in an English
clock auction. This analysis is extended by altering the bargaining power of the
nal buyer and reseller in the resale market to determine how this impacts the
strategies followed in the initial auction. Theoretical and behavioral analysis is
used to develop hypotheses of speculation and demand reduction that are then
directly tested in a controlled experimental setting.
The goal of the experimental design is to determine if the existence of a
resale opportunity alters behavior from what is observed in an auction without
resale, such that active inter-bidder resale does exist, and if active inter-bidder
resale exists, is the structure of bargaining in the resale market relevant? The
resale market is restricted to an automatic transfer determined from the values
of the bidders, the price resulting in the auction, and the bargaining power allo-
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cation to ascertain if individuals clearly understand and implement the strategic
implications of resale. For this research, the use of the laboratory to examine
auctions with resale will allow for the control of many factors (i.e. values, in-
formation, and the form of the resale market) to help understand the impact of
resale markets and bargaining power on auction behavior.
The starting point for this analysis is the English clock auction. The domi-
nant strategy in an English auction where resale is prohibited is that all bidders
bid their value. With bidders following such a strategy, active inter-bidder re-
sale cannot exist. Therefore, it seems even more paradoxical that active resale
could exist after an English clock auction. However, when the English auction is
followed by a resale market, bidders may choose to follow other strategies, such
as some bidders engaging in demand reduction which could lead to inter-bidder
resale.
Haile (1999) derives equilibrium outcomes for rst and second price auctions,
as well as English auctions, followed by a resale trade market. Haile nds that
all auctions with privately known values, when followed by a resale opportunity,
have the same equilibrium outcome as the auction without the resale opportu-
nity. In the case of English auctions this is bidding ones value. Haile does not,
however, claim or prove that value bidding is a unique equilibrium which leaves
open the question of whether other equilibria exist that can explain inter-bidder
resale in a private values framework.
One possibility, which is closer in spirit to the previous story of traders in
the recycling industry, is the model developed by Garratt and Tröger (2006).
They include a speculatingbidder, whose use value is known to be zero. This
bidder only exists because of the possibility of resale and only has intentions to
resell in the event of winning. While they do nd standard value bidding to be
an equilibrium in the second price auction setting, they also nd a continuum
of equilibria where the speculator wins with positive prot demonstrating how
the addition of resale can result in inter-bidder resale.5 The primary interest of
this paper is to determine if inter-bidder resale can also emerge if speculating
bidders are given positive values and not restricted to a value of zero.
Garratt, Tröger and Zheng (2009) present a model that proves the existence
of a tacit collusion equilibrium involving demand reduction when an English
auction is followed by a resale opportunity. This equilibrium requires a public
randomization device, sunspot,which chooses the speculating bidder for the
one-shot game. It is a cut-o¤ equilibrium, where the designated speculator bids
a value equal to a cut-o¤ price. If a bidder has a value below this type, then
they would bid zero, if a bidder has a value above this type, then they would
bid their value. This model includes bidders who have positive values and
it is shown that inter-bidder resale emerges in this scenario. The theoretical
model presented in this paper sets up a similar cut-o¤ equilibrium where the
cut-o¤ value is determined by the maximum possible value, and in that sense
can be interpreted as a special case of the Garratt, Tröger and Zheng model.
Specically, I demonstrate theoretically that if resale is allowed, in addition
5The second price auction is strategically equivalent to the English (ascending auction)
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to value bidding, other equilibria also exist where a speculating bidder bids
an amount high enough to induce the remaining bidders to drop out (demand
reduce).
This paper will test if active resale will exist due to demand reduction and
speculation, and the impact of resale bargaining power on the incentive to de-
mand reduce and speculate. If at least one bidder chooses to demand reduce
then active resale can occur. As bargaining power shifts towards the nal buyer
in the resale market, the expected payo¤ in resale is increasing and therefore
the incentive to demand reduce is also increasing. The possibility of resale also
encourages speculation with the intention of reselling to a bidder who is demand
reducing. If a bidder believes that at least one bidder is demand reducing, then
it may be possible to protably speculate.
The possibility for demand reduction and speculation to emerge should be
expected to relate to the bargaining structure of the resale market, but because
value bidding is a strong attractor of behavior, it is important to understand if
bidders can internalize the changing incentives of the resale market into their
behavior. To examine this issue, additional theoretical analysis and a set of
experimental sessions are constructed for a non-standard resale market which
eliminates value bidding as an equilibrium.
Standard resale assumes that the resale surplus is the di¤erence between
the highest value and the value of the winner of the auction, or the price paid
in the auction, whichever is higher. The non-standard resale market assumes
that the resale surplus is the di¤erence between the winner of the auction and
the price paid in the auction. While the non-standard resale market might be
seen as odd, it has some useful advantages from the perspective of experimental
design. Under the non-standard resale structure, value bidding is no longer
supported as a Nash equilibrium when the nal buyer receives more than 50%
of the resale surplus. Therefore, this set of non-standard resale sessions allows
experimental control over the decision space of the subjects. It identies whether
or not subjects are internalizing the resale market bargaining changes into their
behavior. For example, under the standard format when the resale market
is dened as the di¤erence between values and bidders chose to bid value, it
is di¢ cult to disentangle whether or not the subjects understood that value
bidding was the equilibrium strategy to follow, or if the subjects were confused
because the structure of the resale market was too much to integrate into their
decisions in the auction, and simply failed to respond. Structuring a portion of
the experimental design around this non-standard form of resale allows us to
empirically glean the answer to the latter
The second portion of experimental sessions utilizes standard resale mar-
kets. Under standard resale markets, it is shown that value bidding and other
equilibria that involve speculation and demand reduction jointly exist, so these
standard sessions are used to determine if shifts in bargaining power can pull
people away from value bidding towards a mix of speculation and demand re-
duction, assuming bidders understand the implications of resale.
Other experimental papers have addressed auctions with resale. Lange, List,
and Price (2004) rst conduct a eld study using timber auction data from
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Canada, followed by an experiment in a rst-price auction setting with resale.
Georganas (2007) studies an English auction with resale where the resale market
was an automatic selling of the good after the auction for a price equal to the
highest value drawn or an English auction, testing Haile (2003). Informational
backgrounds were also changed. Georganas nds substantial deviation from
value bidding and uses models of bounded rationality to explain the deviation.
The remaining sections of this paper include theoretical and behavioral pre-
dictions in section 2. The experimental design is discussed in section 3 with an
analysis of the results in section 4. Section 5 concludes, including a discussion
of the steps that will be taken to move forward.
2 Theory and Behavioral Predictions
Haile (1999) established that in a second price auction with independent private
values, the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy of bidding ones value remains
an equilibrium strategy when the auction is followed by a resale market. While
value bidding is an equilibrium, multiple other equilibria also exist which de-
pend on the bargaining power allocation in the resale stage. This section will
demonstrate this by presenting an additional asymmetric equilibrium, using the
standard resale market structure that includes both demand reduction and spec-
ulative behavior which is particularly useful for an examination of how behavior
changes with bargaining power. Following this, I will demonstrate that value
bidding no longer remains an equilibrium under the non-standard resale market
and conclude with behavioral predictions that generalize to both the standard
and non-standard forms of resale.
2.1 Standard Resale
The model assumes a second price auction6 followed by a resale market where
the resale price is determined by the bargaining power, , held by the nal buyer
over the resale surplus. The resale surplus is dened as the di¤erence between
the highest value and the value of the winner, or the price paid in the auction,
whichever is higher. The nal buyer earns a percentage, ; of this surplus and
the reseller earns the remaining percentage, 1   . The reseller additionally
earns the di¤erence between their value and the auction price if the latter is less
than their value. The addition of resale allows bidders another opportunity to
gain the item, if they were unable to obtain the item in the initial auction. It
also allows bidders the opportunity to win the item and resell for a prot, in a
situation where they might have otherwise earned zero.
If a bidder exploits the presence of resale and chooses to speculate, then value
bidding may no longer be a best response. As a simple example of why value
bidding is no longer a best response, imagine a group of 4 bidders participating
in a second price auction with values 10, 20, 30, and 40. If there is a resale
6For modeling purposes, the second price auction is strategically equivalent to an ascending
(English) auction.
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market then the resale surplus is split equally by the nal buyer and reseller.
Under the standard value bidding equilibrium, the bidder with a value of 40
would win at a price of 30, for a payo¤ of 10 to the winning bidder and 0 to the
remaining three bidders and resale would not occur.
Now assume instead that the rst bidder with a value of 10 chooses to specu-
late by bidding an amount equal to 45. If the remaining three bidders anticipate
the speculating behavior of the rst bidder, they are all better o¤ by demand
reducing to a bid of zero allowing the speculating bidder to win the auction at
a price of zero. The nal buyer earns 15 which is his share of the resale surplus
dened as the di¤erence between the highest value of 40 and the value of the
winning speculative bidder, 10. The reseller, selling at a price of 25 which was
determined by the 50/50 surplus split, earns 25, which is the di¤erence between
the price he resold for and the price he paid in the auction. The remaining bid-
ders are no worse o¤ as they continue to earn zero under the demand reduction
strategy. While this demonstrates the Pareto improvement of demand reduction
and speculation, more work is needed to generate an equilibrium analysis.
2.1.1 Speculation and Demand Reduction Equilibrium
The environment consists of n  2 bidders participating in a second price auc-
tion followed by a resale market. Values are drawn independently from a com-
mon distribution with cumulative distribution function, F; and probability den-
sity function, f; with support over the range vi 2 [0; 1]. For what follows below,
the distribution is assumed to be uniform. Each bidder knows the realization
of their value, vi, but not the realization of othersvalues, only the distribution
that othersvalues are drawn from. At the end of the auction, the highest value
is revealed and the resale surplus is dened as the di¤erence between the highest
value and the winners value, or the price resulting from the auction, whichever
is higher.
The resale market is assumed to take the form of a split of the resale surplus
after the initial auction. If the winner of the auction does not have the highest
value resale takes place. The winner of the auction becomes the reseller and the
loser with the highest value becomes the nal buyer in the resale market. The
nal buyers share of the resale surplus is given by  2 [0; 1]: Correspondingly,
the resellers share of the resale surplus is dened as 1  . The nal buyer and
reseller split the entire resale surplus, and the resale price is determined from
this split.
An equilibrium is calculated where n   1 bidders employ a strategy where
they all bid zero, bi = 0. One bidder, the speculating bidder, chooses a bid,
bs; equal to the cut-o¤ value, vc; that would make a bidder with the maximum
possible value indi¤erent between staying in the auction and demand reducing.7
Proposition 1 In an English clock auction with a resale opportunity and n risk
neutral bidders, assuming a uniform distribution on the common support [0; 1]
7A more in-depth proof of the proposition is given in the appendix.
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and  2 [0; 1], the following bidding strategy prole constitutes an equilibrium,
1. One bidder, the speculator, bids the cut-o¤, vc = 1  n
2. all other n  1 bidders bid zero
Proof. Equation (1) denes the expected payo¤ to a bidder choosing to demand
reduce to a bid of zero, which is equal to the nal buyers share of the resale
surplus that a bidder would earn in the event that he has the highest value. The
resale surplus is dened as the di¤erence between the value of the nal buyer
and the expected second highest value. This assumes that the winner of the
auction has the second highest value, which minimizes the potential gain from
resale by the nal buyer.
(1) ueqi (v; ; Y1; :::; Yn 1) = F (v)
n 1E[(v   Yn 1)jYn = v]
Equation (2) denes the expected payo¤ to a bidder choosing to bid an
amount greater than the cut-o¤ value to win the auction with certainty. The
rst part of equation (2) gives the expected payo¤ in the event the bidder has
the highest value and keeps the item, where he earns his value less the price
resulting from the auction. The second part of the equation gives the expected
payo¤ in the event he becomes the reseller because another bidder has a higher
value. It includes the resellers share, 1 , of the resale surplus which is dened
as the di¤erence between the expected value of the nal buyer and the value
of the winning bidder. In addition to the surplus split, the reseller also earns
an amount equal to the di¤erence his value and the price paid in the auction.
Equation (2) is only dened for values greater than or equal to the cut-o¤ value,
vc; because the expected payo¤ for a bidder whose value is in the range [0; vc)
includes negative potential earnings which make it strictly less than the expected
payo¤ to a bidder whose value is greater than or equal to the cut-o¤. As a result,
we can restrict attention to the range of values where v  vc:
(2) udevi (v; ; vc; v1; :::; vn 1) = F (v)
n 1(v vc)+(1 v) f(1  )E[(vj   v)jvj > v] + (v   vc)g ; v 
vc
A speculator who bids an amount equal to the cut-o¤ leaves a bidder with a
value of 1 indi¤erent between bidding above the speculator and demand reducing
to a bid of zero. Any bid by the speculator above vc generates a strictly higher
payo¤ for a bid of zero than deviation by a bidder with a value of 1. For bidders
with values in the range [0; 1); equation (1) is strictly greater than equation
(2) rejecting any protable deviation from a bid of zero to a bid higher than
the cut-o¤. To demonstrate this, suppose deviation is protable, if so then the
relationship given by (3) should be non-negative.
(3) udevi   ueqi  0
= vn 1(v   1 + n ) + (1  ) (1 v)
2
2 + (1  v)(v   1 + n )   v
n
n
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=   12nv (v   1)
 
2v + nv2   2nvn + 2vn   nv   nv + nv2 < 0; which
is a contradiction of the assumption.
Thus it holds that for the remaining n   1 (non-speculative) bidders, a bid
of zero constitutes an equilibrium strategy.
In summary, the equilibrium presented above demonstrates that in addition
to value bidding, strategies of speculation and demand reduction also theoret-
ically exist when resale is possible. The equilibrium construction relies on the
cut-o¤ bid of the speculating bidder, which was calculated as the value that
would make a bidder with the maximum possible value indi¤erent between de-
mand reducing to a bid of zero and staying in the auction. It is worthwhile to
note that vc represents the lower bound on the bid of the speculator and the
equilibrium is also supported by any bid above vc: The speculators bid depends
critically on the bargaining power allocation, of which the derivative is decreas-
ing, @bs@ < 0: This simple property provides insight into how the bargaining
power allocation changes the behavior of the speculating bidder. As the bar-
gaining power of the nal buyer increases, the amount that a speculator must
bid to induce bidders to demand reduce is decreasing. Correspondingly, as the
bargaining power shifts away from the nal buyer to the reseller, the amount
that a speculator must bid is increasing.8
However, it must be noted that directly observing the exact speculation and
demand reduction equilibrium presented above or the value bidding equilibrium
in a laboratory setting would be di¢ cult. A primary source of this di¢ culty is
the ability of subjects to coordinate. First, they must simultaneously determine
what equilibrium to play, and on a second level if they choose to engage in
speculation and demand reduction, they must coordinate on who would play
the role of the speculator.
2.2 Non-standard Resale
From an empirical perspective, the existence of value bidding and specula-
tion/demand reduction equilibria under the standard resale model makes it
di¢ cult to determine if bidders are able to understand resale opportunities and
integrate these incentives into their bidding decisions. Examining the auction
with a non-standard resale market provides a control treatment for this con-
founding situation.
The only set-up di¤erence between the non-standard resale model and the
standard resale model is that the non-standard resale surplus is now dened
as the di¤erence between the highest value and the price resulting from the
auction. Consider again a second price auction for a single object with n risk
neutral bidders, where each bidder draws their privately known value, vi 2 [v; v],
from a commonly known distribution, F , with density function, f . Each bidder
8 If  = 0, the nal buyer earns zero in resale, so the speculator must bid at the maximum
of the value distribution, which is 1. Of course, this equilibrium also exists in an English
auction without resale, but behaviorally appears more likely when resale is possible.
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knows the realization of their value, vi, but not the realization of othersvalues,
only the distribution that others values are drawn from. At the end of the
auction, the highest value is revealed and the resale surplus is dened as the
di¤erence between the highest value and the price resulting from the auction.
Proposition 2 Value bidding is not an equilibrium bidding strategy when the
auction is followed by a non-standard resale surplus split given
 > v1 E[Yn 1jYn=v1]v1 E[Yn 2jYn=v1]
Proof. Assume n  1 bidders are choosing to follow the value bidding strategy,
b(v) = v. To show that this strategy is not an equilibrium strategy of the game,
it su¢ ces to show that the remaining bidder can protably deviate to a some
bid other than their value. Assume that F is distributed on the support [0; 1],
and let Y1; :::; Yn 1 denote the smallest,..., largest estimates from v2; :::; vn 1
Let  2 [0; 1] denote the nal buyers share of the resale surplus. The winner
of the auction becomes the reseller in the resale market and their share of the
resale surplus is dened as (1  ). The expected payo¤ to the bidder who bids
their value is
(1) u1(v1; Y1; :::; Yn 1) = F (v1)n 1E[(v1   Yn 1)jYn = v1]
The expected payo¤ to value bidding is the same as the expected payo¤ to
value bidding auction without the resale opportunity because the bidder with
the highest value wins the auction, and there is no resale. Inter-bidder resale
only occurs when the bidder who wins the auction does not have the highest
value.
Consider instead that this bidder chooses to bid zero, b(v) = 0. The expected
payo¤ to a bidder who deviates to a bid of zero is
(2) u1(v1; ; Y1; :::; Yn 2) = F (v1)n 1E[(v1   Yn 2)jYn = v1]
Value bidding is not an equilibrium as long as the expected payo¤ from
deviating to a bid of zero is greater than the expected payo¤ of value bidding.
This holds if
(3)  > v1 E[Yn 1jYn=v1]v1 E[Yn 2jYn=v1]
As long as the nal buyers share of the resale surplus is greater than the
ratio of the payo¤ from value bidding to the payo¤ from bidding zero, then
value-bidding is no longer supported as an equilibrium strategy.
Simply stated, the nal buyer must have enough resale bargaining power to
capture the share of the resale surplus that is greater than the payo¤ from value
bidding, otherwise they would just bid value. For expositional purposes, assume
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that F is a uniform distribution on the support [0; 1]. Under that assumption
it can be seen that value bidding is not an equilibrium strategy if  > 12 :
With n bidders, if , the nal buyers share of the resale surplus is greater
than :5, then deviation to a bid of zero, or any bid between 0 and the expected
third highest value (Yn 2), will occur if he believes all other will bid value. If
 = :5, then the bidder is indi¤erent between value bidding and deviating to a
lower bid, and if  < :5, all bidders will value bid, and the standard equilibrium
outcome will hold. Clearly, the nal buyers share and correspondingly, the
resellers share of the resale surplus is important for bidding strategies.
2.3 Behavioral Predictions
Based on the formal analysis presented above, there are some particular types
of behavioral deviations from standard value bidding that we may expect to see.
Demand Reduction: If a bidder believes they hold the highest value, they
will be more likely to demand reduce (bid below value). This bidder runs the
risk of not winning the auction, but if they are not the highest value, then they
are no worse o¤ than under the value-bidding equilibrium. If the bidder is able
to demand reduce at a low enough value, then he can participate in the resale
market for a positive surplus. The incentives to demand reduce are higher
if the bidder believes they hold the highest value, and we would expect that
behaviorally, this incentive to demand reduce would occur more often for higher
values in the distribution versus lower values. As bargaining power is shifted to
the nal buyer, the incentive to demand reduce is stronger as the expected payo¤
from resale is increasing. This should result in a demand reduction strategy
being followed by bidders for a larger range of values, moving to lower values,
over what would be observed if the bargaining power was shifted in favor of the
reseller.
Speculation: If a bidder believes they hold a value lower than the highest
value in the group and they understand the incentives to demand reduce by
higher valued bidders, they would hold some expectation of prot in the resale
market. Given that they believe they do not have the highest value, then the
incentive will be to speculate, as the only way to earn non-zero prot will be
to win the auction and resell to the high value holder in resale. The incentive
to speculate is higher for lower values on the value distribution, as it is more
likely that another member of their bidding group has drawn a higher value. As
this is an inverse relationship, we should see speculation decreasing for a bidder
as his value increases. As bargaining power is shifted to the reseller in the
resale market, this will increase the incentive to speculate. This should result
in speculative strategies being followed for a larger range of values, moving to
higher values.
If speculation and demand reduction take place, then the revenue to the
seller may be di¤erent, on average, from the standard value-bidding equilibrium
prediction of the second highest value. If demand reduction is dominant, then
the price resulting from the auction should be lower than the auction price that
would occur without a resale market. If speculation is dominant, then the price
11
resulting from the auction should be higher than what would occur in a similar
auction without resale.
Given the above theoretical and behavioral analysis, the primary goal of
the experimental design will be to test what happens to bidding strategies and
revenue from the initial auction as bargaining power is shifted to and from the
nal buyer and reseller in the resale market. The baseline of analysis is a 50/50
split of the resale surplus. The bargaining power treatments involve shifting the
share of the surplus from a 50/50 split to a 90% share for the advantaged player
(nal buyer or reseller) in order to make the bargaining power shifts salient
and because creating an equal share of the resale surplus will serve as a useful
benchmark of bargaining power to determine baseline behavior.
Shifting away from this benchmark to a higher nal buyer share (lower re-
seller share) should exhibit a higher frequency of demand reduction. As the
surplus shifts in favor of the highest value holder, the speculation distance will
decrease for all values and the demand reduction distance will increase. More
bidders will attempt demand reduction. The lowest values on the distribution
may still speculate, but not by as much. The reasoning behind this is that the
expected return on speculation decreased, while the expected return on demand
reduction increased. The revenue for the initial seller in the auction should be
lower under this resale split than under the 50/50 split due to demand reduction.
Shifting to a lower nal buyer share (higher reseller share) should exhibit
a higher frequency of speculation. As the surplus shifts in favor of the seller,
the speculating distance will become closer to the demand reduction distance
for all values. Also, more bidders will attempt speculation (perhaps switching
from value-bidding or demand reduction), and at higher values than in the
50/50 treatment. The values on the highest end of the distribution will bid
closer to values, if not their values. The reasoning behind this behavior is that
the expected payo¤ from speculating increased. Correspondingly, the expected
payo¤ from demand reduction decreased. The revenue for the initial seller in
the auction should be higher under this resale split than under the 50/50 split
or the split in favor of the nal buyer due to increased speculation by bidders.
3 Design of Experiments
The experiments were designed to analyze bidding behavior di¤erences in an
auction as bargaining power, dened as the share of the resale surplus, is shifted
between the nal buyer and the reseller in the resale market. To accomplish
this goal, three symmetric treatments of an English clock auction followed by
an automatic non-standard resale market were created using a within subjects
design, di¤ering only in the share of the resale surplus earned by the nal buyer
and reseller in the resale market. A second set of three treatments, parallel in all
ways to the rst set of three treatments except for the form of the resale market,
were also created to examine the change in behavior when the standard resale
market was implemented. I will refer to these as experiment 1 and experiment
2, respectively.
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The specic procedures are as follows:
Undergraduate students were recruited using ORSEE, Greiner (2004), and
brought into the laboratory at Florida State University where they participated
in an ascending English clock auction followed by an automatic resale market
for a hypothetical good. Sixteen subjects participated in each of the 8 sessions
run. Four of the 8 sessions implemented the non-standard resale market and
the remaining four implemented the standard resale market. In each session,
the 16 subjects were randomly divided into two groups of 8. The subjects were
then randomly placed into two subgroups of 4 within each group of 8.
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software, Fischbacher (2007).
In the non-standard resale sessions (experiment 1) the subjects were given in-
structions which included two examples of bidding behavior. One demonstrated
when automatic resale would occur and one when automatic resale wouldnt oc-
cur. In the standard resale sessions (experiment 2), subjects were given instruc-
tions which included three examples of bidding behavior. The rst illustrated
when resale would not occur, and the remaining two illustrated the automatic
resale market when the winners value was below the auction price and when the
winners value was above the auction price. The di¤erence in protocol between
experiments 1 and 2 was minimal to maintain parallelism. The primary di¤er-
ence was the additional example provided in experiment 2, which was necessary
to explain the added outcome possibility in the standard resale market. In ad-
dition to the instructions, subjects participated in one unpaid practice period
against three computerized bidders (robots), prior to the start of the paid pe-
riods, to become accustomed to the computer interface. After the instructions
and practice period, the subjects entered into the paid phase of the experiment.
They played this phase for 20 periods.
In each period, subjects randomly drew their private valuation for the hypo-
thetical good from a uniform distribution on the range [0,100]. The maximum
bid allowed was 100, which is the maximum of the value distribution. They
participated in the auction through a computer interface, where they were able
to see a bid clock gradually increasing from 0 in increments of 1. The subjects
chose to drop out when the bid clock reached a price they were no longer
willing to pay.
The auction ended when three bids had been placed, or when the bid clock
hit 100. The winner of the auction was the last remaining subject and any
ties were broken randomly by the computer program. At the conclusion of
the auction, if the subject with the highest value did not win the auction, the
resale market transaction automatically took place. The resale market involved
an automatic transfer of the hypothetical good to the highest-valued subject.
In experiment 1 (non-standard resale), the nal buyer earned a share of the
di¤erence in their value and the price in the auction. The reseller earned the
remaining share of this di¤erence. In experiment 2 (standard resale), the nal
buyer in the resale market earned a share of the di¤erence in their value and
the value of the winner, or the price in the auction, whichever was higher. The
reseller earned the remaining share of this di¤erence and any positive di¤erence
remaining between their value and the price paid in the auction.
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After the automatic resale market, in addition to being informed about their
earnings, subjects were given feedback about whether or not resale occurred, the
highest value, the price paid in the auction, the resale price and earnings of the
resale participants.
The treatments involved varying the respective shares of the nal buyer and
the reseller in the resale market and these shares, dened by the treatments,
were identical regardless of the form of the resale market (standard or non-
standard). If the winner of the auction was the highest-valued subject, there
was no resale, and the winner earned the di¤erence between their value and the
price resulting from the auction. The use of an automaticresale market was
chosen to tightly control outcomes from the resale market to allow for careful
observation of the e¤ects from manipulating bargaining power.
The choice of bargaining power in the treatments was based on the theoreti-
cal and behavioral predictions mentioned in section 2. A 50/50 split of the resale
surplus was established as the baseline treatment. The second and third treat-
ments varied the advantage between the nal buyer and the reseller from the
50/50 baseline. The bargaining advantage percentage was chosen to be 90% to
ensure that subjects would understand and incorporate the shift in bargaining
power into their decisions.9 The three treatments are dened as follows:
Experiment 1 (non-standard resale)
50/50 Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market earned 50% of the
di¤erence between the highest value and the bid price in the auction. The
reseller in the resale market earned the remaining 50%.
Reseller Advantage Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market earned
10% of the di¤erence between the highest value and the bid price in the auction.
The reseller in the resale market earned the remaining 90%.
Final Buyer Advantage Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market
earned 90% of the di¤erence between the highest value and the bid price in the
auction. The reseller in the resale market earned the remaining 10%.
Experiment 2 (standard resale)
50/50 Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market earned 50% of the
resale surplus, dened as the di¤erence between their value and the maximum
of the winners value or the price paid in the auction. The reseller in the resale
market earned the remaining 50% of the resale surplus, and any remaining
di¤erence between their value and the price paid in the auction.
Reseller Advantage Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market earned
10% of the resale surplus, dened as the di¤erence between their value and the
maximum of the winners value or the price paid in the auction. The reseller
9The percentage split, , must lie between 0 and 1. Shifting from .5 to .9 (.1) for the
advantaged (disadvantaged) bargainer makes it clear to the subjects that one resale participant
has a stronger (weaker) position. In particular, it is far enough from the .5 baseline to ensure
that the payo¤s implied by a shift in either direction (to .1 or .9) are understood. Choosing
at the maximum of the distribution, 1, would confound the results.
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in the resale market earned the remaining 90% of the resale surplus, and any
remaining di¤erence between their value and the price paid in the auction.
Final Buyer Advantage Treatment: The nal buyer in the resale market
earned 90% of the resale surplus, dened as the di¤erence between their value
and the maximum of the winners value or the price paid in the auction. The
reseller in the resale market earned the remaining 10% of the resale surplus, and
any remaining di¤erence between their value and the price paid in the auction.
A within subjects design is used, using the 50/50 treatment as a baseline.
Additional treatments of an English clock auction without resale were not in-
cluded in the design, as prior research on English auctions without resale has
replicated the result that value bidding is understood by bidders to be an equi-
librium strategy and followed in the laboratory.10
In each session, the subjects participated in the 50/50 treatment for the rst
ten periods. After the initial 10 periods, subjects were informed of the change,
given another example showing the change in rules, played another practice
robot round, and either the Final Buyer Advantage treatment or the Reseller
Advantage treatment was implemented. Subjects only participated in one of
the advantagetreatments, in addition to the 50/50. Average earnings of the
subjects in experiment 1 were $23.10, including the show-up fee of $10. Average
earnings of the subjects in experiment 2 were $21.67, also including the show-up
fee of $10. There were zero bankruptcies across all sessions.
4 Results
Initially, I will discuss the impact of the existence of a resale opportunity on
bidding behavior, using the 50/50 treatment as a baseline. Afterwards, the
analysis of bidding behavior will continue but focus on the impact of shifting
the bargaining power to and from the nal buyer and reseller away from the
50/50 baseline and how this increases/decreases the frequency of speculation
and demand reduction. Revenue and e¢ ciency results will be examined in the
nal sections. Results from experiment 1 (non-standard resale) and experiment
2 (standard resale) will be explicitly noted.
4.1 Bidding Behavior
4.1.1 Non-standard Resale (experiment 1)
The primary result derived in the non-standard resale theoretical analysis showed
that value bidding was not an equilibrium strategy when the English auction is
followed by a split of the resale surplus. Figure 1 shows the scatterplot of drop
out bids plotted against values for the observable bids in the 50/50 treatment.
The 45-degree line is included to show where an exit point (bid) equals value. All
10See Alsemgeest et al. (1998) and Kagel et al. (1987) for previous experimental results on
English auctions.
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Figure 1: 50/50 (Baseline) Treatment - Experiment 1
Figure 2: Final Buyer Advantage Treatment - Experiment 1
points above this line indicate speculative behavior (exiting the auction above
value), and all points below this line indicate demand reduction behavior (exit-
ing below value). Regression lines from Table 1, Model 2, are also included to
demonstrate that the treatment e¤ect is captured by regression analysis. Bid-
ding below, above, and at value are all commonly observed, however, it appears
as if value bidding and bidding below value occurs with more frequency than
speculation.
Prior research on English auctions without resale, for example Alsemgeest
et al. (1998) and Kagel et al. (1987), has given consistent results that value
bidding is understood by bidders to be an equilibrium strategy and followed in
the laboratory. These results would show a clustering of bids around the 45-
degree line. It is a striking result that the addition of a simple resale market does
lead to substantial deviations from value bidding in the direction of speculation
and demand reduction.
The Final Buyer Advantage treatment shifted bargaining power away from
the 50/50 split to a 90% share for the nal buyer and a 10% share for the
16
Figure 3: Reseller Advantage Treatment - Experiment 1
reseller. It was predicted that this shift would increase the incentive to demand
reduce, and this strategy would be followed more frequently than in the 50/50
treatment. Figure 2 exhibits the scatterplot of drop out bids plotted against
values for the Final Buyer Advantage treatment. Comparing the scatterplots
for the 50/50 treatment to the Final Buyer Advantage treatment, there is a
clear movement of bids away from speculating and bidding at value to bidding
below value.
It should be noted that while demand reducing appears to be the predomi-
nant strategy, not all bidders are following it. A few bidders are still pursuing
speculative strategies and value bidding. This was also predicted, behaviorally.
If a bidder believes that the majority of bidders in his group are demand reducing
and also believes that he does not hold the highest value, it is a better response
for this bidder, given his beliefs, to speculate. This incentive decreases as his
value increases, which would explain the majority of the speculative behavior
in the middle to lower range of the value distribution.
The Reseller Advantage treatment shifted bargaining power away from the
50/50 split to a 10% share for the nal buyer and a 90% share for the reseller.
It was predicted that this shift would increase the incentive to speculate, and
this behavior would occur more frequently than in the 50/50 treatment. Figure
3 exhibits the scatterplot of drop out bids plotted against values for the Reseller
Advantage treatment. Compared to the baseline 50/50 treatment, we see a clear
shift in bidding behavior towards speculation.
The predominant strategy followed by the subjects is bidding above value,
but a few bidders continue to demand reduce, despite the reduced incentives for
nal buyers in the resale market. A few of the exit points are near the top of
the distribution, meaning the winning bidder had intentions of bidding at the
top of the distribution. Although demand reduction does exist, most bidders
are choosing to speculate or to bid value.
It appears that the subjects are factoring in the incentive e¤ects of the shift
in bargaining power in the resale surplus split into their bidding strategies.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bid Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 13:197
(2:568)
< 0:001 10:841
(2:485)
< 0:001 9:668
(2:721)
0:001
Value 0:551
(0:052)
< 0:001 0:602
(0:053)
< 0:001 0:600
(0:053)
< 0:001
Final Buyer Adv.  8:180
(1:900)
< 0:001  3:758
(3:595)
0:300  2:185
(3:928)
0:580
Reseller Adv. 8:600
(2:346)
0:001 13:323
(4:601)
0:005 17:174
(4:797)
0:001
Final Buyer Adv.
x Value
 0:097
(0:088)
0:272  0:094
(0:088)
0:287
Reseller Adv.
x Value
 0:107
(0:093)
0:255  0:109
(0:093)
0:246
Time-Block 2
(last half 50/50)
2:571
(1:896)
0:180
Time-Block 4
(last half treatment)
 0:691
(2:276)
0:762
Time-Block 4
X Reseller Adv
 3:470
(3:572)
0:335
Obs (Groups) 960(64) 960(64) 960(64)
R2 0:32 0:32 0:32
Table 1: Panel xed e¤ects for bidding in all Treatments (Experiment 1). Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses.
They are choosing to speculate by bidding above value with higher frequency
in the Reseller Advantage treatment and they are choosing to demand reduce
by bidding below value with higher frequency in the Final Buyer Advantage
treatment.
Several panel xed e¤ects models,11 seen in Table 1, are utilized to analyze
bidding behavior between the 50/50, Reseller Advantage, and Final Buyer Ad-
vantage treatments in more depth leading to the rst result. The rst model
directly tests for a treatment e¤ect on bidding. The second model extends the
rst by analyzing the interaction of a bidders value and the treatment applied
to test the behavioral hypothesis that the amount of speculation and demand
reduction depends on your relative position on the value distribution. The third
model was included to test for any learning e¤ects.
Result 1: The addition of the resale market does induce non-value bidding
behavior and bidders are able to integrate the resale market into their initial
bidding decisions. As bargaining power shifts in favor of the nal buyer, more
bidders are choosing to demand reduce. As bargaining power shifts in favor of
the reseller, more bidders are choosing to speculate.
11Random e¤ects models were also tested along with the Hausman test to test for signi-
cant di¤erences in the coe¢ cients estimated with both xed and random e¤ects (null is that
the coe¢ cients are the same). The resulting p-values of the tests were signicant for all
specications, therefore xed e¤ects are used.
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Figure 4: 50/50 (Baseline) Treatment - Experiment 2
All three models demonstrate a positive intercept with a slope less than 1 for
the 50/50, Buyer Advantage, and Reseller Advantage treatments. Bidders are
bidding above their value (speculating) at low values and bidding below their
value (demand reducing) at higher values. The advantage treatments exhibit
non-value bidding behavior, but the direction of bargaining power, towards the
reseller or the nal buyer, impacts if speculation or demand reduction is observed
more often. In all three models, the Reseller Advantage treatment resulted in
a signicant positive intercept shift of the bid. The Final Buyer Advantage
treatment e¤ect also remains constant throughout all three specications, in
the predicted negative direction, but this coe¢ cient loses signicance in models
2 and 3. Model 1, in its simplest form conrms that as bargaining power moves
to the nal buyer in the advantage treatment, that subjects lower their bids. It
also conrms the hypothesis of the Reseller Advantage treatment that bidders
will increase their bids as bargaining power moves in favor of the seller.
4.1.2 Standard Resale (experiment 2)
The results of experiment 1 substantiate the claim that subjects are able to
respond to the incentives given by the resale opportunity, which establishes the
implementation of the standard resale market as a real test of what happens
when the bargaining power is altered.
The primary result derived in the standard resale theoretical analysis showed
that value bidding was not the only equilibrium strategy when the English
auction is followed by a split of the resale surplus. In particular, it was shown
that multiple equilibria exist where one bidder bids a cut-o¤ amount which
depends on the bargaining power allocation, and the remaining bidders bid
zero. The question addressed by these results is, under standard resale markets
do shifts in bargaining power pull people away from value bidding? If bidders
fail to respond to the shifts in bargaining power, the previous results conrm
that the reason isnt an inability to understand the incentives.
Figure 4 shows the scatterplot of drop out bids plotted against values for
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Figure 5: Final Buyer Advantage Treatment - Experiment 2
Figure 6: Reseller Advantage Treatment - Experiment 2
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the observable bids in the 50/50 baseline treatment. Figures 5 and 6 are the
scatterplots for the Final Buyer Advantage and Reseller Advantage treatments,
respectively. Again, the 45-degree line is included to show where an exit point
(bid) equals value, along with regression lines from Table 2, Model 1.
As before, the Final Buyer Advantage treatment shifted bargaining power
to a 90% share for the nal buyer and a 10% share for the reseller. It is clear
that bidding below value has the highest relative frequency in the Final Buyer
Advantage treatment. In comparison to the scatterplot for the 50/50 treatment
it appears that for the upper values in the distribution there is a downward
movement of bids, however it is unclear if bidding below value is followed more
aggressively overall in response to the shift in bargaining power.
The Reseller Advantage treatment shifted bargaining power to a 10% share
for the nal buyer and a 90% share for the reseller. Focusing only on bids that
are above value, the bid amount of the speculative bids in the Reseller Advantage
treatment appears to exceed the bid amount of the speculative bids in the both
the 50/50 and nal buyer treatments. Theoretically this was to be expected
as the bid that a speculator must make to induce bidders to demand reduce
is increasing with the bargaining power of the speculator. However, the large
number of speculating bids is also evidence that the problem of coordination on
the speculating bidder persists.
Figure 7: Empirical CDF bid-less-value (Experiment 2)
As a summary view of bidding behavior across treatments, Figure 7 graphs
the empirical cumulative distribution of the di¤erence between bid and value
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bid Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 10:732
(2:310)
< 0:001 8:904
(2:412)
< 0:001 8:942
(2:862)
0:003
Value 0:499
(0:047)
< 0:001 0:540
(0:054)
< 0:001 0:540
(:054)
< 0:001
Final Buyer Adv.  1:972
(2:138)
0:360 8:056
(3:671)
0:032 6:074
(3:931)
0:127
Reseller Adv. 8:030
(2:464)
0:002 5:315
(3:827)
0:170 5:018
(4:432)
0:262
Final Buyer Adv.
x Value
 0:217
(0:089)
0:017  0:214
(0:088)
0:019
Reseller Adv.
x Value
0:058
(0:076)
0:449 0:059
(0:076)
0:441
Time-Block 2
(last half 50/50)
 0:056
(2:207)
0:980
Time-Block 4
(last half treatment)
0:438
(2:928)
0:881
Time-Block 4
X Final Buyer Adv
3:122
(3:745)
0:408
Obs (Groups) 960(64) 960(64) 960(64)
R2 0:23 0:24 0:24
Table 2: Panel xed e¤ects for bidding in all Treatments (Experiment 2). Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses.
as a summary way to view di¤erences across treatments. In all treatments,
the frequency of bid deviation from value is high, both above value and below
value. The treatments appear to follow the behavioral predictions of shifts in
bargaining power.
The frequency of bidding under value is much higher in the Final Buyer
Advantage treatment, and the frequency of bidding above value is higher in
the Reseller Advantage treatment. The 50/50 treatment appears to be more
similarly distributed to the Reseller Advantage treatment for the demand re-
duction region (negative domain), switching roles in the speculation region (pos-
itive domain) by displaying a similar distribution to the Final Buyer Advantage
treatment. Demand reduction behavior does occur in the Reseller Advantage
treatment, but it does not occur with as much intensity as in the Final Buyer
Advantage treatment for larger deviations in the negative domain.
Speculative behavior occurs in all treatments, but appears more strongly in
the Reseller Advantage treatment and for greater deviations in the positive do-
main. It appears from Figure 7 that the subjects are factoring in the incentive
e¤ects of the shift in bargaining power into their bidding strategies. They are
choosing to speculate by bidding above value with higher frequency in the Re-
seller Advantage treatment and they are choosing to demand reduce by bidding
below value with higher frequency in the Final Buyer Advantage.
Panel xed e¤ects models, seen in Table 2, are again utilized to analyze
bidding behavior between the 50/50, Reseller Advantage, and Final Buyer Ad-
vantage treatments for the standard resale market.
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Result 2: The addition of the standard resale market does induce non-value
bidding behavior.
Models 1-3 all demonstrate a positive intercept with a slope less than 1 for
the 50/50, Buyer Advantage, and Reseller Advantage treatments. Bidders are
bidding above their value (speculating) at low values and bidding below their
value (demand reducing) at higher values.
Result 3: As bargaining power shifts in favor of the reseller, more bidders are
choosing to speculate. In the 50/50 split and as bargaining power shifts in favor
of the nal buyer more bidders are choosing to demand reduce, but demand
reduction is not observed signicantly more in the buyer advantage treatment
than in the 50/50 treatment.
Model 1 conrms that as bargaining power moves to the reseller in the
advantage treatment subjects increase their bids. The negative coe¢ cient on
the Final Buyer Advantage treatment directionally conrms the hypothesis that
bids decrease as bargaining power moves to the nal buyer but this result is not
signicant. This does not imply that demand reduction does not take place,
only that the amount by which subjects lower their bids is not signicantly
di¤erent from the 50/50 treatment where a large amount of demand reduction
already occurs.
A positive coe¢ cient on the Reseller Advantage treatment indicates that as
the bargaining power is shifted in favor of the seller in the resale market, bidders
respond by increasing their bid. The Reseller Advantage treatment resulted in
a positive intercept shift of the bid, but this result is only signicant in Model
1. The Final Buyer Advantage treatment e¤ect gains signicance in Model 2
with a positive intercept shift. While this appears counter to the hypothesis
presented above, it is important to note that in this model the interaction of
value and the Final Buyer Advantage treatment is also signicant and negative.
This signicant slope shift demonstrates that there is demand reduction, but
the amount that a bid is lowered by depends on the value. Bids are decreasing
as values increase. The positive increase in the intercept shift indicates that
at lower values there is speculation. This conrms the behavioral hypothesis
for the Final Buyer Advantage treatment that the relative location of value is
important in determining which strategy might be followed.
Speculation and demand reduction are observed in all treatments. On aver-
age, in Model 2 subjects bid around 54% of their value in the 50/50 treatment.
The slope shift (Value  Adv. Treatment) is negative and signicant for the
Final Buyer Advantage treatment, which lowers the slope to approximately .32.
The slope shift in the Reseller Advantage treatment is positive, but not signi-
cant in either Model 2 or Model 3 where it is examined. All treatments show a
positive intercept, across Models 1-3. This implies that at low values, all treat-
ments have speculation. As values increase, because the slope estimate on value
is less than 1, eventually, demand reduction is predicted for higher values.
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Treatment 50/50 Final Buyer Advantage Reseller Advantage
Total Resale Outcomes 0.41 0.65 0.38
Successful Speculators
(Auction Price > Winners Value & Resale Surplus > 0)
0.08 0.15 0.08
Unsuccessful Speculators
(Auction Price > Winners Value & Resale Surplus <= 0)
0.03 0.10 0.10
Demand Reduction
(Auction Price  Winners Value & Resale Surplus > 0)
0.29 0.40 0.20
Table 3: Relative frequency of resale outcomes of total number of auctions
(resale and no resale), by treatment - Experiment 2
The experimental design creates an environment where inter-bidder resale is
not a certain outcome. If the individual with the highest value wins the auction,
there is no resale, and the outcome and payo¤s are the same as the standard
English clock auction without resale. Therefore, speculating, as a strategy, is
only successful when the speculator is able to resell for a positive surplus amount.
This in turn, is only possible when an individual within the group decides to
follow the demand reduction strategy.
Demand reduction, on the other hand, does not always depend on the strate-
gic decisions of others in a bidding group. This makes it possible to have all
bidders demand reducing. However, if one individual in the group decides to
follow a speculating strategy, it is possible that a demand reducer is paying an
amount equal to their value and is therefore no better o¤ than under a value
bidding strategy. Dene a successful speculator to be a bidder that wins the
auction at a price greater than their value and successfully resells to another
bidder for a positive amount, in other words, the resale surplus is positive.12
Analogously, dene successful demand reduction to be the case where positive
surplus is split in the resale market, without speculation.
To determine how altering the bargaining power helps or hurts these strate-
gies and impacts the existence of inter-bidder resale, Table 3 examines the rel-
ative frequency of successful speculators and demand reduction by treatment.
Resale occurs in all treatments with the highest number of resale outcomes,
65% of all auctions, occurring in the Final Buyer Advantage treatment. As the
bargaining power is shifted in favor of the nal buyer, it is clear that resale
outcomes occur with higher frequency. As the bargaining power moves from the
50/50 treatment to the Reseller Advantage treatment (in favor of the reseller)
the resale frequency falls, but the di¤erence is not substantial.
It has been shown that the Reseller Advantage treatment has the highest
frequency of speculation and the lowest frequency of demand reduction. There-
fore, despite the large amount of speculative behavior, only 8% of speculators
12Recall that the resale surplus is dened as the di¤erence between the highest value in
the group and the value of the winner or the price paid in the auction, whichever is higher.
In this case, the speculator bids an amount greater than their value, so the resale surplus is
simply dened as the di¤erence between the highest value in the group and the price paid in
the auction, given resale occurs.
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All Bidders n = 64 50/50 Final Buyer Advantage Reseller Advantage
Demand Reducers 29 12 10
Speculators 5 2 3
Value Bidders 6 6 5
Multiple Strategies 24 12 14
Non-Switchers n = 41 50/50 Final Buyer Advantage Reseller Advantage
Demand Reducers 18 10 8
Speculators 2 0 2
Value Bidders 3 2 1
Multiple Strategies 18 9 9
Table 4: Bidding Types
were successful, 10% were unsuccessful.13 Speculators have the highest success
rate in the Final Buyer Advantage treatment, obtaining a positive outcome in
15% of the auctions.
Demand reduction outcomes occur with the highest frequency in the Final
Buyer Advantage treatment (40%) and second highest in the 50/50 (29%) treat-
ment. This result is expected given the high rate of demand reduction in both
of these treatments. The Reseller Advantage treatment had a smaller frequency
of demand reduction outcomes than both the 50/50 and Final Buyer Advan-
tage treatments which again is expected given the high rate of speculation and
lowered rate of demand reduction observed in this treatment.
All of the data presented, regardless of the form of resale, demonstrate that
coordination on a particular equilibrium outcome was a di¢ cult task. A natural
follow-up is to determine whether or not individuals follow one particular strat-
egy or if they mix between strategies. To examine behavior on an individual
level, bidders were categorized based on their mean deviation (bid less value),
minimum deviation, and maximum deviation.14 The four categories include:
demand reducers, speculators, value bidders, and bidders who used a combina-
tion of speculation, demand reduction, and value bidding (multiple strategies).
The top level of Table 4 presents the number of bidders in each type for all bid-
ders, by treatment. The lower level presents the number of bidders in each type
for the non-switchers. A bidder was labeled as a non-switcher if their strategy
type remained constant between the 50/50 and advantage treatment.
The most numerous types of bidders are demand reducers and multiple strat-
13A speculator is dened as unsuccessful if the price resulting from the auction is greater
than or equal to the highest value in the group, and the winner of the auction is not the high
value holder.
14Demand reducers were bidders with a negative mean deviation and the maximum de-
viation never exceeded zero. Speculators were bidders with a positive mean deviation and
minimum deviation never less than zero. Bidders categorized as value bidders were bidders
with small mean deviation (typically +/- 3, or less) with a max/min deviation never exceeding
10. The nal category, multiple strategies, consisted of all uncategorized bidders who had a
min/max deviation that spanned both positive and negative domains.
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Treatment 50/50 Final Buyer Advantage Reseller Advantage
Average E¢ ciency
(Standard Deviation)
0:90
(0:176)
0:78
(0:241)
0:90
(0:164)
Table 5: E¢ ciency results by treatment - Experiment 2
egy bidders, regardless of whether all bidders are taken into account or only
the non-switchers. The non-switchers represented the majority of bidders as
approximately 64% maintained a consistent type between the 50/50 and advan-
tage treatment. This consistency does not imply that subjects do not mix. On
the contrary, the large number of multiple strategy bidders (approximately 44%
of non-switchers) gives evidence that subjects do mix strategies, and mix with
consistency. Consistent value bidders and speculators also exist, although not
to as great of an extent as demand reducers and multiple strategy players.
4.2 E¢ ciency and Revenue (standard resale)
Examining the bidding behavior above naturally suggests the question of what
happens to revenue when resale is applied. These results will focus on the
revenue and e¢ ciency results of the standard resale market, as the non-standard
resale market was primarily used to isolate bidder understanding of resale and
is not likely to emerge in a setting outside of the laboratory.
E¢ ciency is measured as the value generated by the auction divided by
the maximum value the auction could have achieved, VV  . It is important to
note that this denition of e¢ ciency applies to both the initial auction, and to
the nal allocation in resale, but this analysis of e¢ ciency only focuses on the
e¢ ciency in the initial auction. By construction, overall e¢ ciency will always
be 1 due to the resale market. As another way of characterizing outcomes from
the auction, we can look at the e¢ ciency generated by that initial allocation.
The purpose is to examine the e¢ ciency of the initial auction given that there
is a resale opportunity. The standard e¢ ciency of an English auction without a
resale opportunity obtained from previous experimental results has resulted in
high e¢ ciency rates.15 The e¢ ciency results of experiment 2 are presented in
Table 5, by treatment. The addition of resale has lowered overall e¢ ciency across
treatments compared to previous experimental results of English clock auctions
without resale. For example, in Alsemgeest et al. from (1998), they report
that for the single unit English clock auction, 100% of the periods achieved
full allocative e¢ ciency of 1, where the highest bidder obtained the item. The
importance of the e¢ ciency results presented in this paper is that the highest
valued bidder is winning less often when resale is allowed.
Result 4: Average e¢ ciency at the auction allocation is approximately the
15High e¢ ciency is close to 1. See Coppinger et al.(1980) for an example of experimental
results of an English auction without resale.
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Average Revenue V (2) Price Deviation
50/50 48:36
(15:049)
61:41
(18:847)
 13:05
(13:217)
Final Buyer Advantage 49:67
(15:947)
59:52
(18:173)
 9:85
(17:158)
Reseller Advantage 58:66
(15:563)
60:95
(17:513)
 2:29
(15:525)
Table 6: Average revenue and deviation from predicted price in auction without
resale for experiment 2. (standard deviation)
same in the 50/50 treatment and the Reseller Advantage treatment, while e¢ -
ciency falls in the Final Buyer Advantage treatment.
Examining the lowered e¢ ciency rates in the initial auction draws attention
to the question of what happens to the initial revenue earned in the auction.
As can be seen in Table 6, the addition of the resale market lowers revenue
across all treatments from the expected revenue without resale. The amount of
deviation depends on the structure of bargaining power in the resale market.
Price deviation is measured as the di¤erence between what was obtained in
the auction with resale given various bargaining structures and the expected
revenue, V(2), obtainable in a standard English auction without resale.16
As bargaining power is shifted away from the reseller, revenue drops for the
initial seller but not in a consistent manner as the 50/50 treatment generates
a stronger price deviation than the Final Buyer Advantage treatment. Across
all treatments, bidders are demand reducing and e¤ectively splitting revenue
that would have been earned by the initial auction seller in the resale market.
As bargaining power is shifted away from the reseller, the incentives to demand
reduce become stronger, and more bidders are demand reducing. As a result,
the probability of a demand reduction outcome is higher and revenue su¤ers.
The 50/50 treatment shows that with resale, the initial auction seller would
earn approximately 78% of what he would have earned in the comparable auc-
tion without resale.17 In the Final Buyer Advantage treatment, revenue is 83%
of what would have been expected in an auction where resale was not possible.
As bargaining power is shifted to the reseller in the resale market the revenue
earned by the initial auction seller is approximately 96% of the revenue the
auction could have earned without resale. The increased speculation due to
the incentives created in the resale market creates competition that increased
the revenue to the initial seller, but not enough to o¤set the demand reduction
behavior that lowers revenue.18
16The predicted price in an English clock auction without resale is the second highest value.
17As noted previously, in an experimental English auction without resale, bidders typically
follow bid your value strategies, where the predicted revenue is equal to the second highest
value. Empirically, because the subjects follow the value bidding strategies, the revenue is
generally close to predicted revenue, see Coppinger et al.(1980).
18The revenue results for experiment 1 (non-standard resale) indicate that under the Final
Buyer Advantage treatment the auction would earn approximately 82% of what would have
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Revenue Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 15:451
(7:013)
0:063 14:590
(8:781)
0:141 8:376
(10:393)
0:447
V1 < 0:001 0:023
(0:132)
0:864  0:025
(0:120)
0:838
V2 0:333
(0:090)
0:008 0:308
(0:146)
0:073 0:485
(0:141)
0:011
V3 0:298
(0:082)
0:008 0:224
(0:121)
0:106 0:291
(0:075)
0:006
V4 0:165
(0:150)
0:308
Final Buyer Advantage  0:754
(1:521)
0:635  1:091
(1:500)
0:491 24:686
(17:612)
0:204
Reseller Advantage 12:054
(3:399)
0:009 12:300
(2:921)
0:004  0:871
(20:735)
0:968
V1  Final Buyer Adv.  0:257
(:194)
0:228
V1  Reseller Adv. 0:560
(0:218)
0:004
V2  Final Buyer Adv.  0:082
(0:107)
0:467
V2  Reseller Adv.  0:527
(0:137)
0:006
Obs (Groups) 160(8) 160(8) 160(8)
R2 0:30 0:30 :32
Table 7: Panel xed e¤ects for revenue in all treatments, experiment 2. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Revenue results for the 50/50, Reseller Advantage, and Final Buyer Advan-
tage treatments are examined in more detail through panel xed e¤ects analysis
in Table 7. The rst and second models directly test the impact of the treat-
ment on revenue. The third model analyzes the addition of the interaction of
the highest and second highest values with the treatment on revenue.
Result 5: Revenue from the initial auction is highest under the Reseller
Advantage treatment, where the reseller has the bargaining power.
Models 1 and 2 both show a strong intercept increase of approximately 12
in the Reseller Advantage treatment. Increasing the bargaining power of the
reseller, in Model 1, raises revenue by approximately 78% over what is obtained
in the 50/50 treatment. In the Reseller Advantage treatment, more speculation
exists and less demand reduction. The competition between speculating bids
translates into higher auction prices which raises revenue. It is clear from these
results that if the bargaining power lies with the potential reseller in an auction,
been possible in the comparable auction without resale. In the 50/50 treatment, revenue is
89% of what would have been expected and the Reseller Advantage treatment resulted in a
5% increase in revenue over the predicted revenue without resale.
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then the initial seller in the auction will benet as the increased amount of
speculation leads to higher revenue.
Result 5: Auction revenue is approximately the same between the Final Buyer
Advantage treatment and the 50/50 treatment.
Models 1 and 2 also show a negative intercept change for the Final Buyer
Advantage treatment, but this e¤ect is not signicant. In both treatments,
demand reduction was the most frequently followed strategy, with the 50/50
treatment having slightly higher rates. Revenue from the initial auction in both
treatments is lower which is a direct result of demand reduction. However, it
does not appear that bidders reacted as strongly to the nal buyer advantage
treatment as they responded to the bargaining shift in favor of the reseller. The
high demand reduction rates already observed in the 50/50 treatment do not
leave much room for a substantial shift as the bargaining power of the nal
buyer increases.
Interestingly but not unexpectedly, in Models 1 and 3, the third highest
value, V3, is positive and signicantly impacts revenue in the 50/50 treatment.
Without resale, we would expect only the second highest value, V2, to have
the strongest inuence on revenue because most bidders follow value bidding
strategies. When value bidding is the strategy played in the English auction, the
bidder with the highest value wins, but pays a price (revenue for the auction)
equal to the second highest bid. However, when the third highest value has
signicant inuence over the resulting price, it indicates that a bidder is demand
reducing and the price resulting is the third highest value instead of the second.
Overall, these results indicate that the initial seller in the auction will earn
less revenue due to the presence of resale and the loss in earnings will increase
if the bargaining split is 50/50 between the nal buyer and reseller or if the
nal buyer has a higher bargaining advantage. If the reseller has the bargain-
ing power, this can mitigate some of the revenue loss associated with demand
reduction due to increased speculation and value bidding behavior.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of the existence of inter-bidder resale and bar-
gaining power within the resale market on bidding behavior and revenue for an
English clock auction. The primary result is that it is clear that the addition of
a resale market opportunity to the standard English auction does indeed alter
the behavior from value bidding in the initial auction. Bidders are able to, and
do internalize resale market outcomes into their bidding decisions in the initial
auction. Understanding that bidders are able to formulate and implement the
strategic implications of resale, at a basic level, is useful to the auctions with re-
sale literature and in practice. When an auction is held, the initial seller should
be aware of any resale opportunities, as this would impact the expected revenue
they would hope to obtain, due to the altered behavior from a standard English
auction without resale.
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Theoretically, this paper demonstrated that in addition to value bidding,
multiple equilibria exist that include speculation and demand reduction as
strategies. The particular equilibrium analyzed in this paper required coordi-
nation on one speculating bidder, while the remaining bidders demand reduced.
The selection of the "speculating bidder" is a di¢ cult coordination problem,
which is compounded by the second coordination problem of which equilibrium
to play. The strategy that achieved the highest frequency of play was demand
reduction, followed by speculation and then value bidding. It is clear from these
results and not surprising that bidders were not able to choosewhich bidder
would speculate and also not surprising that they were not able to explicitly
coordinate on one equilibrium to play. This implies that some form of mixed
strategy equilibrium analysis might more accurately describe behavior when a
resale market is present and the ability to signal intentions or communicate is
not possible.
Behaviorally, this paper hypothesized on how shifts in the bargaining power
allocation of the resale market would impact bidder behavior in the initial auc-
tion, provided bidders understand the resale incentives. If bargaining power lies
with the reseller, there is an incentive to speculate and if bargaining power lies
with the nal buyer, there is an incentive to demand reduce. To test whether or
not bidders understand the implications of resale, a subset of the experimental
sessions implemented a non-standard form of resale which eliminated value bid-
ding as an equilibrium outcome. The results for the non-standard resale market
strongly indicate that bidders do understand the implications of shifts in bar-
gaining power and integrate these incentives into their initial bidding decisions.
Moving forward from these results, additional sessions with a standard re-
sale market were conducted to determine if bidders still responded to shifts
in bargaining power and moved away from value bidding, which exists as an
equilibrium outcome (in addition to others) when English auctions are followed
by the standard resale market. The results for the standard resale market are
not as strong as the results for the non-standard resale market, but the latter
establish that the failure to respond is not indicative of an inability to under-
stand the incentives. However, while not as strong, the directional results for
the standard resale experiments do appear to mimic the results found under
the non-standard resale format suggesting some consistency in the response of
bidding behavior to resale incentives.
The standard resale market sessions were used to examine the impact of
resale on revenue. If the bargaining power lies with the reseller in the resale
market, there is an incentive to speculate. While there is an increased incentive
to speculate, demand reduction is still observed which provides an environment
for successful speculation. Demand reduction lowers revenue, but the incentive
to speculate mitigates, to a certain extent, the loss in revenue that occurs from
demand reduction. It appears that the relative mix of demand reduction and
speculation is key. If demand reduction is dominant, then revenue will decrease.
If speculation is dominant, it should increase revenue. For example, if an auc-
tion is held in an industry with a large amount of lower valued bidders, and
resale is allowed, it is possible that the majority of the bidders will engage in
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speculation and this will actually increase revenue for the initial seller. This
is important for the recycling industry, or any industry inhabited by a large
number of traders. These traders are primarily participating in the auction
with intentions of reselling, and therefore should exhibit speculative behavior.
An attempt to restrict any potential resale, such as excluding traders from the
auction, could potentially lower the revenue achieved in the auction.
Across all sessions, but particularly when the bargaining power lies with the
nal buyer in the resale market or if there is a 50/50 split, there is an incentive to
demand reduce. Again we see a mixture of behavior between demand reduction
and speculation. Despite the increased incentives to demand reduce, speculation
is still observed, although to a lesser degree than demand reduction. Demand
reduction behavior leads to lower revenues than what would be expected in the
same auction without resale opportunities. Demand reduction is observed in
this scenario because the demand reducing bidder is trying to obtain a lower
price for the good, which can happen in this single-unit format only because of
resale. If an initial seller observes that all of the bidders are nal users of the
good (i.e. not traders) who might not want to engage in speculation, it might
benet the initial seller to try to minimize resale. Of course the initial seller,
unless they are a government entity, cannot limit resale outside of the auction,
but the initial seller does have choice over the format of the auction used which
could minimize the impact of resale.
The English clock auction, in particular, appears to be susceptible to suc-
cessful demand reduction due to its sequential nature. Alsemgeest et al.(1998)
suggest that the ability to collude is enhanced by the clock auction and Burtraw
et al.(2008) also nd that successful demand reduction in multi-unit auctions
was more pronounced in clock auctions than in the sealed-bid formats. This
relates to the current research in that bidders are using the resale market as a
way to demand reduce in the single-unit auction. If it is the sequential nature
of the English clock auction that facilitates demand reduction, then it could
be conjectured that a sealed-bid format would be a better choice for the ini-
tial seller to minimize resale by making it more di¢ cult for bidders to demand
reduce. However, this is an untested conjecture.
It is important to note that one of the treatments in the experimental design
of Burtraw et al.(2008) included a spot market for resale after the auction. There
was active resale trade in this spot market. This fact, along with the observation
of demand reduction during the auction suggests that the results of this paper
are robust to alternative specications of resale.
Moving forward, it is important to examine if these results are robust to
other auction institutions, for example a sealed-bid format. Another direction
of future research should determine what types of industry structures lead to
a di¤ering bargaining structures in resale. For future experimental research, in
addition to testing the robustness of these results in alternative auction formats,
the next step would be to endogenize bargaining in the resale market, and allow
bidders to communicate prior to the auction.
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7 Appendix
7.1 In-depth proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 3
Proof. The speculating bidder does not wish to deviate from a bid equal to the
cut-o¤, vc; because the only bid which changes the expected payo¤of this bidder
is a bid of zero. A bid of zero results in a tie for the winner of the auction and
assuming that in the event of a tie a bidder wins the auction with probability  <
1, bidding zero lowers the expected payo¤ of the speculating bidder. Therefore,
a bid of vc constitutes an equilibrium strategy for the speculating bidder. The
next section will examine the strategies of the bidders who are choosing to
demand reduce at a bid of zero.
Suppose bidder i deviates from a bid of zero to any bid below the cut-o¤
value, vc; the bid of the speculating bidder. He would still lose the auction to
the speculating bidder and this deviation would only change his expected payo¤
in the event that the speculating bidders value is below the price resulting from
the auction. In this case, bidder i sets a new auction price equal to his bid
which lowers the resale surplus, leading to a lower expected payo¤ than would
occur under a bid of zero. Therefore, to prove that the strategy constitutes an
equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show that deviation to a bid equal to or greater than
the cut-o¤ value does not increase a bidders expected payo¤ from a bid of zero.
Equation (1) denes the expected payo¤ to a bidder choosing to demand
reduce to a bid of zero, which is equal to the nal buyers share of the resale
surplus that a bidder would earn in the event that he has the highest value. The
resale surplus is dened as the di¤erence between the value of the nal buyer
and the expected second highest value. This assumes that the winner of the
auction has the second highest value, which minimizes the potential gain from
resale by the nal buyer.
(1) ueqi (v; ; Y1; :::; Yn 1) = F (v)
n 1E[(v   Yn 1)jYn = v]
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Equation (2) denes the expected payo¤ to a bidder choosing to bid an
amount greater than the cut-o¤ value to win the auction with certainty. The
rst part of equation (2) gives the expected payo¤ in the event the bidder has
the highest value and keeps the item, where he earns his value less the price
resulting from the auction. The second part of the equation gives the expected
payo¤ in the event he becomes the reseller because another bidder has a higher
value. It includes the resellers share, 1 , of the resale surplus which is dened
as the di¤erence between the expected value of the nal buyer and the value
of the winning bidder. In addition to the surplus split, the reseller also earns
an amount equal to the di¤erence his value and the price paid in the auction.
Equation (2) is only dened for values greater than or equal to the cut-o¤ value,
vc; because the expected payo¤ for a bidder whose value is in the range [0; vc)
includes negative potential earnings which make it strictly less than the expected
payo¤ to a bidder whose value is greater than or equal to the cut-o¤. As a result,
we can restrict attention to the range of values where v  vc:
(2) udevi (v; ; vc; v1; :::; vn 1) = F (v)
n 1(v vc)+(1 v) f(1  )E[(vj   v)jvj > v] + (v   vc)g ; v 
vc
Equation (3) denes the expected payo¤ to a bidder choosing to bid an
amount equal to the cut-o¤ value. Again, this equation is only dened for values
greater than or equal to the cut-o¤ value, vc; by the same argument presented
for equation (2). If bidder i deviates to a bid equal to the cut-o¤ value, vc;
he ties with the speculating bidder, and wins the auction with probability :
He loses the auction with probability 1  ; and only earns prot if he has the
highest value and shares the surplus with the winner of the auction. The resale
surplus in equation (3) utilizes the price resulting from the auction, vc; as this
is the maximum surplus possible in resale for the losing bidder if they become
the nal buyer.
(3) ub=vci (v; ; vc; v1; :::; vn 1) = (1  )(F (v)n 1(v  vc)) + (F (v)n 1(v 
vc) + (1  v) f(1  )E[(vj   v)jvj > v] + (v   vc)g); v  vc
A bid equal to the cut-o¤ does not generate an expected payo¤ greater than
that of a bid greater than the cut-o¤. To see this, note that the expected payo¤
from winning the auction in equation (3) is identical to that of equation (2), but
is weighted by the probability of winning, , which is less than 1. Thus, for the
expected payo¤ given by equation (3) to exceed the expected payo¤ given by
equation (2) , the expected payo¤ from losing the auction must exceed the payo¤
from winning the auction, which it does not. Therefore, to prove deviation from
a bid of zero is not protable, a comparison of the expected prot for a bid
greater than the cut-o¤ to the expected prot of a bid of zero is su¢ cient.
The bid of the speculator,bs; is dened as the cut-o¤ value which would
make a bidder with the highest possible valuation, v = 1, indi¤erent between
demand reducing to a bid of zero and winning the auction by deviating to a bid
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higher than that of the speculator. It is obtained by equating equations (1) and
(2). The cut-o¤ value, given by equation (3), is the minimum bid that must be
placed by the speculating bidder:
(3) bs = 1  n = vc
A speculator who bids an amount equal to the cut-o¤ leaves a bidder with a
value of 1 indi¤erent between bidding above the speculator and demand reducing
to a bid of zero. Any bid by the speculator above vc generates a strictly higher
payo¤ for a bid of zero than deviation by a bidder with a value of 1. For bidders
with values in the range [0; 1); equation (1) is strictly greater than equation
(2) rejecting any protable deviation from a bid of zero to a bid higher than
the cut-o¤. To demonstrate this, suppose deviation is protable, if so then the
relationship given by (4) should be non-negative.
(4) udevi   ueqi  0
= vn 1(v   1 + n ) + (1  ) (1 v)
2
2 + (1  v)(v   1 + n )   v
n
n
=   12nv (v   1)
 
2v + nv2   2nvn + 2vn   nv   nv + nv2 < 0; which
is a contradiction of the assumption.
Thus it holds that for the remaining n  1 bidders, a bid of zero constitutes
an equilibrium strategy.
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